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This paper scrutinizes the rationale for the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) by Bank of Ghana 
in 2002. In this case, we determine the stability or otherwise of the relationship between money 
supply and inflation in Ghana over the period 1970M1-2016M3 using battery of econometric 
methods. The empirical results show an unstable link between inflation and monetary growth in 
Ghana, while the final state coefficient of inflation elasticity to money growth is positive but 
statistically insignificant. We find that inflation elasticity to monetary growth has continued to 
decline since the 1970s, showing a waning impact of money growth on inflation in Ghana. 
Notably, there is also evidence of negative inflation elasticity to monetary growth between 2001 
and 2004, lending support to the adoption of IT framework in Ghana in 2002. We emphasized 
that the unprecedented 31-months of single-digit inflation (June 2010-December 2012), despite 
the observed inflationary shocks in 2010 and 2012, reinforces the immense contribution of the IT 
framework in anchoring inflation expectations, with better inflation outcomes and inflation 
variability in Ghana. The paper therefore recommends the continuous pursuance and 
strengthening of the IT framework in Ghana, as it embodies a more eclectic approach to policy 
formulation and implementation. 
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I. Introduction  
The macroeconomic imbalances of the 1970s and early 1980s triggered the adoption of the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) to help 
resuscitate the ailing economy. A key component of the reforms was the financial sector reform 
(FINSAP)1. These market oriented reforms led to a more dynamic financial system which 
encouraged rapid expansion of banking activities (Kovanen, 2011). In addition, the advent of 
modern payment technology and electronic banking services has resulted not only in the 
reduction of daily demand for cash but has also supported financial inclusion. 
 
These policy initiatives were envisioned to translate into improved monetary policy transmission 
mechanism but the general consensus was that fiscal dominance was undermining the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in Ghana, as persistence fiscal deficits were financed by 
monetary accommodation. Consequently, strong inertia in inflation expectations became 
embedded in the economy, underpinned by high inflation and exchange rate volatility. A core 
challenge for monetary policy, therefore, was to break the inflation inertia, and this was 
perceived as a prerequisite for achieving the primary objective of price stability. In view of the 
remaining challenges, a second wave of financial sector reforms was launched in 2001, mainly to 
address regulatory impediments and its associated corporate governance issues. This reflected 
the passage of several laws which enhanced the institutional architecture of the financial system. 
Perhaps, the most significant landmark was the promulgation of the Bank of Ghana Act, 2002, 
Act (612), which granted the Bank of Ghana operational independence and the establishment of 
the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) with the responsibility of formulation and 
implementation of monetary policy. Upon its inauguration in September 2002, the MPC adopted 
inflation targeting (IT) as a framework of monetary policy2. The ensuing critical policy question 
therefore is “why did Bank of Ghana abandon the monetary targeting framework and instead 
adopt the inflation targeting framework?” According to Jahan (2012), the monetary targeting 
framework works well (i) if the central bank can control the money supply reasonably well and 
                                                          
1This included the liberalization of interest rates and abolition of directed credit, restructuring of financially 
distressed banks, strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory framework, the establishment of the Ghana Stock 
Exchange (GSE), and promotion of non-bank financial institutions. The foreign exchange market also witnessed 
progressive reforms, culminating in the floating of the exchange rate and the establishment of forex bureaus to help 
eliminate the parallel markets. 
2While some authors refer to the official announcement to date the adoption of IT (see Kwakye, 2012), we support 
the position of Bawumia et al. (2008) that even though formal announcement was made in May 2007, Inflation 
Targeting was launched in the latter part of 2002. 
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more crucially (ii) if money growth is stably related to inflation over time. Even casual 
empiricism of the era preceding the adoption of IT revealed that monetary targeting had limited 
success amid high inflation and inflation volatility accompanied by continual missing of inflation 
targets, which echoed badly on the credibility of the central bank.  
 
The objective of this paper therefore is to investigate whether at the time Ghana adopted the IT 
framework, money growth was stably related to inflation. We will do so by employing a simple 
monetarist state-space model with time-varying coefficients using the kalman filter. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the only paper that investigates whether money growth is stably related 
to inflation in Ghana over time. The extant literature has rather focused on the stability of the 
demand for money in the context of Ghana, although the results have been inconclusive due to 
differences in sample periods, data frequencies, monetary aggregates used and model 
specifications. For instance, Ghartey (1998) found a stable demand function for narrow money in 
Ghana. Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo (2003) also concluded on a stable long-run relationship 
between inflation and broad money in Ghana. In contrast, Andoh and Chappell (2002) showed 
that structural adjustment programs led to structural breaks in the demand for broad money. 
Similarly, Bawumia, Amoah and Mumuni (2008) asserted that structural reforms and the 
deregulation of the financial sector have resulted in significant parametric shifts in the demand 
for broad money in late 1990s and that money growth rates are no longer accurate signposts for 
forecasting future inflation and real output. Recently, Kovanen (2011) finds a stable money 
demand function for Ghana but cautions that the stability is not a sufficient condition to conclude 
that money provides a useful contribution to the inflation dynamics in Ghana. The foregone 
studies clearly amplify that the current study, which specifically investigate inflation-money 
growth nexus, is germane as it offers fundamental policy implications for Ghana as well as 
countries with similar characteristics. Besides, the study can be updated regularly (on monthly 
basis) as part of the repertoire of tools used by the MPC for its inflation risk assessment. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section (2) looks at the stylized facts of 
monetary growth and inflation in Ghana. Section 3 briefly takes up the issues of theoretical 
framework, methodology and data, Section 4 presents the empirical results and analysis, while 
Section 5 provides the conclusion. 
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2. Stylized Facts on Ghana 
2.1 Developments in Monetary Growth and Inflation  
For most central banks across the globe, the primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain 
low and stable prices by using available policy instruments to regulate and control value and 
quantity of money. This is based on the notion that "inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon" as professed by famed economists David Hume, Milton Friedman (see 
section 3). This was premised on the quantity theory of money, derived from the idea that a fast-
growing economy allows the government to create more money to help pay for its services 
without causing inflation. However, inflation results when money growth is faster than real GDP 
growth. 
The historical relationship between money growth and inflation in Ghana is well apparent, 
especially prior to the year 2002, as depicted in figure 1. In particular, the 1970s and early 1980s 
were characterised by high and volatile inflation, largely as a result of persistent monetary 
growth. The continuous monetary expansion was also triggered by incessant monetary 
accommodation of fiscal expansion fuelled by significant political interference in the operations 
of central bank (Ayensu, 2007). Monetary situation continued to worsen and inflation was out of 
control in 1983, culminating in a comprehensive stabilization programme in consultation with 
the IMF and the World Bank by October 1983. These reforms, inter alia, saw a vigorous 
promotion of liberal monetary and market-oriented interest rate in the 1988-90, resulting in a 
revival of interest rate policy as a tool for monetary control. The evolving monetary policy 
brought some relative stability, as the monetary expansion and excess liquidity which had 
plagued the economy since the early 1970s, was brought under control. For instance, the growth 
in money supply declined from 27.3 percent in 1988 to 5.3 percent in 1991. The rate of inflation 
also plummeted from 31.4 percent in 1988 to 18 percent in 1991 and further to 10 percent at the 
end of 1992.  
Despite the seeming successful implementation of monetary policy under the SAP, the deficit 
financing through the central bank suddenly resumed, in addition to borrowings from the private 
sector through the money market in 1993.  The increase in money supply during the year was 
believed to be consequences of a massive injection of cash into the economy to finance 
electioneering campaigns in the latter part of 1992. The bank intensified its open market 
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operation (OMO) to mop up excess liquidity by introducing a number of BOG bills in the money 
market. Although this led to reduction in liquidity, it did not succeed in dampening the growth in 
money supply. By 1994, money supply had increased by more than 50 percent, driven by 
massive increase in net foreign assets instead of deficit financing. This resulted in restrictive 
monetary policy stance between 1995 and 1997, reflecting series of hikes in bank and discount 
rates alongside aggressive OMO operations.  
A particular important development was the redefinition of money supply to include foreign 
currency deposits in 1997 (henceforth called M2+), as part of the restrictive policy measure to 
fight against excess liquidity and inflation. This further resulted in a new structure of reserve 
requirement to reflect the inclusion of foreign currency deposits in M2+. These stringent 
monetary policy measures yielded significant macroeconomic performance by curtailing the rate 
of money growth alongside declining inflation. For instance, the rate of growth in money supply 
had dropped from 23 percent in 1997 to 19.2 percent in May 1999 before picking up to 26.8 
percent at the end of 1999. At the same time, inflation also dwindled from 20 percent in 1997 (or 
47% in 1996) to 9.4 percent in May 1999 before rising to 13.8 percent in December 1999.  
 
However, unfavourable external conditions on the back of falling world prices of cocoa and gold 
coupled with rising crude oil price during the second half of 1999 through to 2000 disrupted the 
macroeconomic gains. This reflected monetary expansion, on the back of injection of revaluation 
gains caused by the significant depreciation of the cedi (by over 49% in 2000). For instance, 
growth in money supply rose significantly to 46.5 percent in 2000 and moderated gradually to 
41.4 percent at the end of 2001. This was mirrored in an astronomical increase in inflation to 
40.5 percent at the end of 2000 before easing to 21.3 percent in 2001, calling for further stringent 
monetary policy measures.  
 
It was against this background that the Bank of Ghana shifted to inflation targeting regime in 
2002, following the promulgation of the Bank of Ghana Acts 2002 (Act 612) which granted an 
operational independence to the central bank and the establishment of monetary policy 
committee (MPC) as well as strengthening the Bank’s primary objective of maintaining price 
stability. Therefore, the focus of the central bank now shifted from one of considerable fiscal 
relaxation and monetary accommodation to one of fiscal and monetary stringency. Since 2002, 
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the divergence between money growth and inflation has become more apparent as rising growth 
in money supply is oftentimes associated with declining inflation and vice versa. This stimulated 
empirical research on the stability of money demand function, in a quest to ascertain the 
applicability of the quantity theory of money in the case of Ghana.  
Figure 1: Monetary Growth and Inflation, March 1971 – March 2016 
 
2.2 Current IT Framework  
The IT framework is based on the notion that policy is designed to target inflation through an 
inflation forecast. Given that the inflation forecast is a function of many macroeconomic 
variables, policy reacts to a whole range of variables, not just money supply as in the case of 
monetary targeting framework. That is, the IT framework is premised on the fact that inflation is 
not solely a monetary phenomenon, but other factors do influence prices. In this framework, the 
monetary policy tool of the BOG is the monetary policy rate (MPR), while the operating target is 
the overnight money market interest rate (Interbank rate). The MPR is the rate around which a 
policy corridor is defined for central bank’s acceptance of deposit and granting of credit to 
commercial banks. The MPR is set, every other month, at a level considered appropriate by the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to deliver the medium-term inflation target. Essentially, the 
MPR is expected to communicate the stance of monetary policy of the Central Bank and also 
serve as a guide for all other market interest rates. That is, for the monetary policy to have the 
desired impact on inflation (the prime objective) and the overall economy, it is critical that 
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changes in MPR affect retail interest rates (e.g. lending and deposit rates) via the wholesale 
interest rates (preferably, interbank rate) and ultimately influence the overall economy and 
inflation. 
 
The IT process particularly begins with public announcement of an explicit quantitative target 
for inflation. Currently, the inflation target for the medium term is 8% (±2%). When inflation 
stays above target for some obvious reasons, the MPC’s aim would be to change interest rates so 
that inflation can be brought back to target within a reasonable period of time without creating 
undue instability in the economy.  
 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets every other month to assess a comprehensive set of 
forecast based presentations on the real, monetary, fiscal, external, and financial sectors to 
ascertain medium term risks to the attainment of inflation target. Assessment of deviation of 
actual inflation from the target determines how the monetary policy rate (MPR) should be 
positioned by the MPC. Presently, decisions on the MPR are based on consensus at the MPC 
meetings and communicated to the public via press releases, media encounters, briefing sessions 
& seminars and publication of Monetary Policy Report. The final part involves the 
implementation of the policy decision by the relevant departments of the BOG dealing with the 
repurchase agreements (repo and reverse-repo activities in the interbank markets), BOG and 
GOG securities markets, bonds issuance and redemption as well as through the sale and purchase 
of foreign exchange in the interbank market. 
 
In order to increase the efficiency of the transmission of monetary policy and enhancing the 
transparency and competitiveness of the interbank money market, the BOG has since 2005 
introduced a number of policy reforms. Notable among them are the introduction of interest rate 
corridor, bordered by the reverse repo and repo rates in a bid to influence liquidity in the 
interbank market; and the amendment of the BOG Act to strengthen the independence of the 
central bank.  
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3. Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Data issues 
3.1   Theoretical Framework 
In monetary economics, the Friedman’s quantity theory of money (QTM) avers that money 
supply has a direct and proportional relationship with the price level. The QTM was clearly 
specified as follows: 
𝑀𝑉𝑇 = 𝑃𝑇𝑌,                              (1) 
Where 𝑀 is the total amount of money in circulation on average in an economy during the 
period, say a year; 𝑉𝑇 is the transactions velocity of money, that is the average frequency across 
all transactions with which a unit of money is spent. This reflects the availability of financial 
institutions, economic variables, and choices made as to how fast people turn over their money. 
𝑃𝑇 is the price level associated with transactions for the economy during the period; Y is real 
index of aggregate transaction (or output).  
The theory requires some assumptions to be made about the causal relationships among the four 
variables in equation (1). There are debates about the extent to which each of these variables is 
dependent upon the others. Nevertheless, the quantity theory postulates that the primary causal 
effect is an effect of M on P (that is ∆𝑀 = ∆𝑃). 
Even though mainstream economists generally approve that the quantity theory is valid in the 
long run, there remains contentions about its applicability in the short run. Opponents of the 
theory contend that velocity of money is unstable and prices are also sticky in the short run. 
Therefore, the direct relationship between money supply and price level, as stipulated by the 
quantity of exchange, does not hold over the short run. Consequently, while economists 
generally accepted the QTM, they placed emphasis on different variable(s) as the main driver(s) 
of price change. For instance, Marx emphasized on production (output), Marshall, Pigou and 
Keynes focused on demand for money (thus emphasizing income and demand) instead of money 
supply using Cambridge equation, while Friedman reiterates the quantity of money. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Stability test and Linear state-space model 
We employ a battery of procedures to test the stability or otherwise of the relationship between 
money supply and inflation in Ghana. These include the CUSUM test and recursive coefficients 
tests conducted to check for parameter (in)stability from a fitted ordinary least square (OLS) 
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model. Once these tests confirm unstable relationship between money supply and inflation, we 
proceed to model the relationship between the two by employing a simple monetarist state-space 
framework with time-varying coefficients using the kalman filter. 
Our simple monetarist model can be stated as follows:  
𝑑𝑝_𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼𝑑𝑚_𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                     (2) 
Where 𝑑𝑝_𝑚 is the demeaned3 inflation, 𝑑𝑚_𝑚 is the demeaned monetary growth, 𝛼 captures 
the constant inflation elasticity of money supply growth, 𝜀 is the stochastic error term, and 𝑡 is 
time. We examine the fit and stability of the linear relationship between 𝑑𝑝_𝑚 and 𝑑𝑚_𝑚 by 
estimating equation (2) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
 
Should the system in equation (2) fail the stability test and the estimated elasticity of inflation 
vis-à-vis monetary growth appears to be changing over time, then we will proceed to remodel the 
relationship in a state space form. Although a general form of a linear state-space model has 
quite a few components, it can always be written as a system of two equations. In this regard, 
equation (2) is recast as: 
𝑑𝑝_𝑚𝑡 = 𝑑𝑚_𝑚𝑡𝛼𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡                                        (3) 
                          𝛼𝑡 = 𝛾𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡                                                    (4) 
Where equation (3) is the measurement equation and equation (4) is the transition equation while 
𝜇𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, 𝜎𝜇
2) and 𝜖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, 𝜎𝜖
2). It is obvious from (3) and (4) that the parameter, 𝛼, is 
now a time-varying process (i.e., an unobservable state variable) which captures the time-varying 
inflation elasticity with respect to monetary growth. For simplicity, we assume that the state 
variable follows a random walk process (i.e., 𝛾 = 1). However, since the disturbance 𝜇𝑡 in the 
measurement equation (3) is an error of measurement, the two error terms (𝜇𝑡 and 𝜖𝑡) may be 
contemporaneously correlated. In view of this, the state-space model naturally lends itself to 
modelling systems with measurement error. There are three unknowns in the system, namely, the 
state variable (𝛼𝑡), and the two variances (𝜎𝜇
2 and 𝜎𝜖
2), which are estimated using the maximum 
likelihood technique. 
 
There are two main benefits to representing a dynamic system in state space form. First, the 
state-space form allows unobserved variables to be incorporated into and estimated alongside the 
                                                          
3 Demeaning allows us to estimate the model without a constant 
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observed model. Second, state–space models can be analyzed using the powerful recursive 
Kalman Filter (KF). The KF due to Kalman (1960, 1963) and Kalman and Bucy (1961) is an 
algorithm for generating minimum mean square error forecasts in a state-space model. 
Especially, the KF is a recursive algorithm for sequentially updating the one-step ahead estimate 
of the state mean and variance given new information. If the Gaussian error is assumed, the KF 
allows the computation of the log-likelihood function of the state-space model, and in turns, 
permits the model parameters to be estimated via maximum likelihood methods. 
 
In order to circumvent the possibility of rendering our regression analysis spurious, we examine 
the stationarity properties of the variables by performing the following Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test on each variable: 
∆𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡(𝜌 − 1)𝑋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑗∆𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1
                                                     (5) 
Where ∆ is the first-difference operator, t is a linear time trend, 𝑒 is a covariance stationary 
random error term and 𝜌 is determined by Schwartz criterion to ensure serially uncorrelated 
residuals. The hull hypothesis is that 𝑋𝑡 is a nonstationary series and is rejected if ((𝜌 − 1) < 0 
and statistically significant. The model specification demands that both variables are difference 
stationary (i.e., I(1)). 
 
3.2.3   Dataset 
We use monthly data spanning January 1971 and March 2016, a sample size determined not only 
by the availability and quality of reliable data but also by our desire to capture the dynamic 
relationship between monetary growth and inflation over the three distinct phases of monetary 
policy practices in Ghana, namely, direct control, monetary targeting and inflation targeting 
regimes. CPI (inflation) data is sourced from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) while the 
money supply data is collected from the Bank of Ghana.  
 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Stationarity Test 
The result of the ADF tests is reported in Table 1. It is evident that the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity cannot be rejected for the variables at levels. We conclude, therefore, that the 
variables are non-stationary at levels. Applying the same tests to first differences to determine 
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the order of integration showed that the critical values (in absolute terms) are less than the 
calculated test statistics for both variables, suggesting that the variables are stationary after first 
difference. Given that the variables are integrated of the same order, we proceed with the 
regression analysis, confident that the results we present here are not spurious. 
Table 1: ADF Unit Test 
Note: *denotes significance at 1%; Critical values are 1% level = -3.975046; 5% level = -3.418117; 10% level = -3.13153.      
Critical values and one-sided p-values are taken from MacKinnon (1996) and reported in E-views 9.0 
 
 
4.2 Constant Parameter Estimates and Stability Tests 
The result from the simple monetarist model (as stated in equation 2) is presented in Table 2. The 
estimate of 𝛼𝑡 (which captures the response of inflation to monetary growth – constant inflation 
elasticity of monetary growth) is positive and seems to suggest that monetary growth is 
statistically significant in explaining inflation dynamics in Ghana. However, the model’s overall 
fit seems poor, while further tests suggest model instability. For instance, CUSUM test, which is 
based on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals, points to parameter instability as it goes 
outside the 95% critical bands and only returns into the critical bands after several periods (see 
Figure 3). Again, the recursive coefficients test, which traces the evolution of 𝛼𝑡 as more and 
more of the sample data are used in the estimation also indicates a significant variation and 
dramatic jumps, especially prior to 1995, a further evidence of model instability.  
 
A critical look at Figure 4 also reveals that the strong relationship between monetary growth and 
inflation observed in the early part of the sample has dramatically waned after 1986, with two 
noticeable downward blips during 1995 and 2002. This strong evidence of parametric shift 
inherent in the model leads us to conclude that a constant parameter model is inappropriate to 
capture the true dynamic relationship between monetary growth and inflation developments in 
Ghana. Therefore, the results contained in Table 1 should be taken with a pinch of salt. In view 
of this, the appropriate approach to modeling the relationship between monetary growth and 




Variables Levels p-values First Difference p-values
Money supply (M2+) -0.47343 0.9845 -14.14457 0.0000*
inflation (CPI) -0.35853 0.9888 -11.34712 0.0000*




Table 2: Constant Coefficient of Inflation Elasticity 
 
Figure 2: overall fit of the model 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DP_M                                                        
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1971M01 2016M03   
Included observations: 543   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DM_M 0.775278 0.073440 10.55658 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.170545    Mean dependent var -4.31E-17 
Adjusted R-squared 0.170545    S.D. dependent var 0.197021 
S.E. of regression 0.179435    Akaike info criterion -0.596165 
Sum squared resid 17.45078    Schwarz criterion -0.588251 
Log likelihood 162.8587    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.593070 

















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Residual Actual Fitted
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Figure 4: Recursive Coefficients Test 
 
 
4.3 Time-Varying Inflation Elasticity of Monetary Growth (The State Space Model) 
Since we have concluded that the system represented by Equation (2) has failed the stability test 
and the estimated constant inflation elasticity of monetary growth does not reflect the dynamic 
relationship between inflation and monetary growth, we now proceed to estimate the remodeled 
relationship in a state space form as depicted in equations (3) and (4). As indicated earlier, 𝛼𝑡 
(the inflation elasticity of monetary growth) is now a time-varying process. Table 3 presents 





















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
CUSUM 5% Significance
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optimization algorithm. The system’s convergence was immediately achieved (after zero 
iteration). The estimated coefficients of 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜖𝑡, represent the logs of variance of the 
measurement and transition equations respectively; while 𝛼𝑡, is the estimate of the state variable 
(i.e., the time-varying inflation elasticity with respect to monetary growth).  
Table 3: Time-Varying Coefficient Elasticity of Inflation 
 
 
The estimation results reported in Table 3 indicate that 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜖𝑡 are statistically significant, a 
confirmation that the system has been estimated more precisely. The estimated coefficients also 
show that the inflation process, 𝜇𝑡 is higher than that of the state variable 𝜖𝑡, suggesting that the 
state variable may be capturing the slow-moving components in the economy (such as real GDP 
and interest rates) after adjusting for variations in the money supply. Since the coefficients of 𝜇𝑡 
and 𝜖𝑡 are the logs of the variance of the error terms for the measurement and state (transition) 
equations respectively, we estimate the variance of the measurement equation (𝜎𝜇
2) as: (𝜎𝜇
2) = exp 
(-4.136491) = 0.015979, and that of the transition equation (𝜎𝜖
2) as: 𝜎𝜖
2= exp (-1.025106) = 
0.358758. 
 
Sspace: SSPACE_OUTPUT   
Method: Maximum likelihood  (BFGS / Marquardt steps) 
Sample: 1971M01 2016M03   
Included observations: 543   
Convergence achieved after 0 iterations  
Coefficient covariance computed using the Huber-White method with observed Hessian 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     𝜇𝑡   -4.136491 0.166651 -24.82132 0.0000 
𝜖𝑡   -1.025106 0.427066 -2.400344 0.0164 
     
      Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     𝛼𝑡  0.733380 0.891703 0.822449 0.4108 
     
     Log likelihood 240.3914     Akaike info criterion -0.878053 
Parameters 2     Schwarz criterion -0.862226 
Diffuse priors 1     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.871865 
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Table 3 also displays the final one-step ahead4 value of the state variable, 𝛼𝑡, equal to 0.7333 
with a corresponding root mean square error (RMSE) value of 0.8917. The estimated coefficient 
of 𝛼𝑡 appears to be high, suggesting that a 1 percent increase in money supply growth will lead 
to a 0.7333 percent increase in the rate of inflation. However, both the z-statistic (0.822449) and 
the p-value (0.4108) show that the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant, implying 
that money monetary growth exerts a weak positive influence on inflation. This result further 
suggests that inflation in March 2016 and perhaps immediately after in Ghana was explained by 
other factors and not necessarily monetary growth. Therefore, monetary targeting would be an 
inappropriate framework of monetary policy for this era.  
 
But does this outcome necessarily justify the adoption of inflation targeting as a framework of 
monetary policy by the Bank of Ghana in 2002. A definitive answer demands tracing out the 
time path of 𝛼𝑡, particular around the period in which IT framework was adopted. Figure 5 
presents the time path of the inflation elasticity of monetary growth and confirms the earlier 
evidence of non-constancy of the relationship between inflation and monetary growth. In other 
words, there is clear evidence that inflation and money supply growth have not been stably 
related in Ghana.  
 
Despite a brief period of declines in the early 1970s, including a number of negative5 readings, 
the inflation elasticity rose generally in much of the 1970s, peaking at 7.2 percent in July 1977. 
This suggests that a 1 percent increase in money supply leads to a 7.2 percent increase in 
inflation and is statistically significant6. Thereafter, the elasticity broadly trended downward with 
some negative readings in much of 1979 before ending the decade at 0.25 in December 1979. 
Average inflation elasticity for the 1970s was 1.44 (see figure 6). Much of this period coincided 
with the direct control regime of monetary policy and high incidence of fiscal dominance, where 
large fiscal deficits were predominantly accompanied by monetary accommodation. Without a 
formalized framework to anchor inflation and inflation expectations, increases in money supply 
was interpreted by economic agents as engendering inflationary pressures so that as money 
                                                          
4 While this value represents the inflation elasticity of monetary growth for March 2016, the results suggests that the 
inflation elasticity immediately after March 2016 would not differ substantially from this value (0.7333).  
5 This was a brief period of remarkably low monetary growth and low and stable inflation 
6 Test for coefficient significance is not reported here but is available upon request. 
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supply rose, inflation rose even more sharply – in a sense inflation in this decade was 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon. 
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Note: SV1 denotes the elasticity of inflation to changes in monetary growth (𝛼𝑡) 
 
Figure 6: Average Inflation Elasticity of Monetary Growth 
 
 
Inflation elasticity of monetary growth rose markedly from the early 1980s, reaching a high of 
5.6 in December 1983 which was statistically significant. This was largely on account of the 
persistent monetary growth, triggered by continuous monetary accommodation of fiscal 
expansion on the back of substantial political interference in the operation of the central bank 
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sector reforms from the mid-1980s, the elasticity of inflation declined steadily throughout the 
remainder of the decade, averaging -0.20 between January 1985 and December 1989. In fact, the 
average inflation elasticity for the entire decade (i.e. January 1980 to December 1989) stood at 
1.14, compared to 1.44 recorded for the preceding decade (see Figure 6).  
 
Interestingly, the inflation elasticity of monetary growth continued its downward trend into the 
1990s, registering several negative readings before witnessing some appreciable and statistically 
significant increases by the middle of the decade. The statistically significant relationship 
between money supply growth and inflation during this period is a clear justification of the 
adoption of monetary targeting as a framework for monetary policy by the Bank of Ghana in the 
1990s. However, the second half of the decade witnessed broadly weaker and statistically 
insignificant relationship between money supply growth and inflation. It is essential to note that 
the average inflation elasticity of monetary growth for the January 1990 and December 1999 
period was 0.53, compared with the 1.14 recorded in the preceding decade and 1.44 for the 1970s 
(see Figure 6). With Bank of Ghana clutching on monetary targeting as a monetary policy 
framework in the face of lower inflation elasticity and weaker relationship between money 
supply growth and inflation, inflation outcomes had been less than satisfactory amid high 
inflation volatility and persistent deviations from targets. Perhaps, the time was ripe to jettison a 
framework which had promised so much theoretically but delivered little in reality at least in the 
context of Ghana. 
 
The downward trajectory of the inflation elasticity continued into the 2000s, turning negative 
between August 2001 and September 2004. Again, the average inflation elasticity for the entire 
decade, namely, January 2000 to December 2009, stood at 0.13 compared with 0.53 recorded in 
the 1990s (see Figure 6). This evidence clearly suggests that monetary targeting as a framework 
of monetary policy at the time would have yielded very little in terms of delivering the desired 
inflation outcome. And this was precisely the situation at the time where inflation targets were 
persistently missed, questioning the credibility of the Bank of Ghana and hence leading to 
entrenched inertia in high inflation expectations. It was against this background that the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of Ghana upon its inauguration in September 
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2002 decided to abandon its monetary targeting framework in favour of inflation targeting as a 
framework of monetary policy.  
 
Nevertheless, the trajectory of the inflation elasticity of monetary growth generally turned 
upward from 2010, as the average elasticity rose to 1.24 exceeding that of the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s (see Figure 6). The sub-sample analysis, as exhibited in figure 7 and Appendix A1, also 
shows that inflation elasticity of money supply growth inched up to 2.6 as at end-December 2010 
and 2.1 for end-December 2012, and were all statistically significant at 10 percent alpha levels. 
The strong inflation elasticity of monetary growth in 2010 may be attributed to the 
implementation of the single spine salary structure (SSSS), resulting in a significant growth in 
wages and salaries (increase in money supply) and creating strong aggregate demand. Likewise, 
the fiscal excesses during the presidential and parliamentary election in 2012 also appear to 
explain the pick-up in inflation elasticity of money growth during the era.  
Figure 7: Final State Inflation Elasticity of Monetary Growth 
 
 
Despite these challenges since 2010, the IT framework produced the longest consecutive (31-
months) single-digit inflation episode in the history of Ghana between June 2010 and December 
2012. The unprecedented low inflation during the period was largely facilitated by two major 
disinflation factors. First, considerable foreign exchange inflows from the production and export 
of crude oil resulted in relative stability in exchange rate in 2010 and 2011 which dampened the 
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inflationary pressures. The second factor is the continuous tighter monetary policy stance (the 
MPR was increased from 12.5% in December 2011 to 15.0% in June 2012 and was maintained 
throughout the year) which also countered the high inflation elasticity of money growth observed 
in 2012. Undoubtedly, the inflation targeting framework has contributed immensely in anchoring 
economic agents’ inflation expectations, leading to better inflation outcomes and inflation 
variability. The foregoing empirical evidence (i.e. the negative relationship between money 
supply growth and inflation) clearly lends support to the MPC’s decision to adopt the inflation 
targeting framework. 
 
4.4 Shocks to the System 
Figure 8 presents evidence of shocks to the system over the study period. We observe high 
volatile shocks between 1971 and 1985, a period synonymous with direct control regime and 
high levels of monetary accommodation of fiscal deficits. No doubt, inflation and inflation 
volatility were extremely high during this period. Following the erratic pattern of shocks in 
1970s and 1980s, we identify two inflationary shocks in 1994 and 2011-12 and three 
disinflationary shocks in 1991-92, 1995-97, and 2010-11. The economy did not benefit from the 
disinflationary shocks prior to 2010-11 due perhaps to the absence of a formalized credible 
framework to help anchor inflation expectations and rein in the entrenched high inflation 
expectations at the time.  
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By 2010, however, the IT framework had gained traction amid the official announcement in 
2007 that the Bank of Ghana had adopted inflation targeting as a framework of monetary policy. 
This formalized policy framework facilitated the unprecedented two and half years of single-
digit inflation following the disinflationary shock in the 2010-11. Again, the recent significant 
deviation of inflation from target could be attributed to the inflationary shock of 2011-12.  
 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This paper empirically examines the rationale for the adoption of inflation targeting by Bank of 
Ghana in 2002. In this regard, it determines the stability or otherwise of the relationship between 
money supply and inflation in Ghana over the period 1970M1-2016M3. We deplored a battery of 
econometric techniques, especially CUSUM and recursive coefficients tests for parameter 
instability, and developed a simple monetarist state-space framework with time-varying 
coefficients based on the kalman filtration to detect possible changing elasticities of inflation to 
monetary growth. 
 
Fascinatingly, we generally observed an unstable link between inflation and monetary growth in 
Ghana, as evidenced by the CUSUM and recursive coefficient tests. In addition, we observed 
that the final state coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. This connotes that 
inflation elasticity of monetary growth was not necessarily explained by monetary growth as at 
end-March 2016. Consequently, the use of monetary targeting would be an inappropriate 
framework of monetary policy.  
 
Notably, although the inflation elasticity of monetary growth continued its downward trend into 
the 1990s and registered several negative readings, it witnessed some appreciably positive and 
statistically significant values by the middle of the decade. The significant relationship between 
money supply growth and inflation within this period serves as a clear justification of the 
adoption of monetary targeting framework by the Bank of Ghana in the 1990s. 
 
However, downward trajectory of the inflation elasticity to monetary growth continued into the 
2000s, turning negative between August 2001 and September 2004. Again, the average inflation 
elasticity for the entire decade (January 2000 to December 2009) was very low compared with 
the levels recorded in the preceding decades. This clearly suggests that upholding the monetary 
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targeting as a monetary policy framework during the period January 2000 to December 2009 
would have yielded very little in terms of delivering the desired inflation outcome.  
 
In lieu of the foregoing evidence of negative relationship between money supply growth and 
inflation in recent years, the current study lends support for the Bank of Ghana’s decision to 
adopt inflation targeting (IT) framework in 2002. There is no doubt that the IT framework has 
contributed immensely in anchoring economic agents’ inflation expectations, leading to better 
inflation outcomes and inflation variability. This is because the IT framework produced an 
unprecedented episode of single-digit inflation from June 2010 to December 2012, reinforced by 
exchange rate stability (in 2010-11) and tighter monetary policy stance (in 2012) which quelled 
the observed inflationary shocks in 2010 and 2012. The paper therefore recommends a 
continuous pursuance and strengthening of the inflation targeting framework in Ghana, as it 
embodies a more eclectic approach to policy formulation and implementation.  
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Appendix A 
1. Sub-Sample Analysis of Final State Elasticity of Inflation to changes in Money Supply 
 
Note: *** denotes 10% significant level 
 
 
